About this site

This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.

Introduction

Anthea J Jeffery

SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS JOHANNESBURG 1997

PUBLISHED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

Auden House, 68 De Korte Street
Braamfontein, Johannesburg, 2001 South Africa
Copyright South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997
PD 18/1996
ISBN 0-86982-453-8

While the Institute endeavours to publish accurate information and bona fide statements of opinion, it cannot be held liable in the event of the information being inaccurate or any opinion expressed being faulty.

Members of the media are free to reprint or report information, either in whole or in part, contained in this publication on the strict understanding that the South African Insti- tute of Race Relations is acknowledged. Otherwise no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electrical, mechanical, photocopy, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Cover design by Suzette Duby.

Map by Harry Sidiropoulos.

Acknowledgements

It is difficult to give adequate thanks to all who have made this study possible. Particular appreciation is due, at least, to the following:

Patricia Barnard, who laid the foundation for the study by beginning to develop a 'diary' of conflict in Natal;

Cheryl Chipps and Colleen Werth, who at different times took on the job of providing research and secretarial assistance;

Judi Hudson, who subsequently took on the task of developing a diary of conflict in Natal, and produced a comprehensive overview of events from the late 1980s to the early 1990s;

Prisca Nkosi, Alfred Nkungu, and other library staff at the Institute, who helped to develop the compendium of press reports on which this study has drawn;

Ellen Potter and Tamara Dimant, the Institute's librarians, who helped on many occasions to track down the information needed;

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, who helped to check the final copy for the gremlins that might otherwise have gone undetected;

Jill Wentzel, who provided friendship and light relief through many times of difficulty; and

Sarah Zwane, who spent long, uncomplaining hours typesetting and correcting a text updated in many ways at many different times; as well as Connie Matthews, who assisted in this time-consuming task.

Special thanks are also due to Adrienne Verlaque-Napper, Daphne Lowenthal, and Minessa Rosman-and to all the other 'moms' who helped take care of Duncan.

Particular thanks are also due the respondents who gave so generously of their time and insights. They preferred, in most part, to remain anonymous.

For Duncan

Author's Note

This is a long book. No executive summary has been provided, however, as a brief account of this kind cannot do justice to the complexities of the conflict in KwaZulu/Natal. It is nevertheless possible to obtain a broad overview of the differing theories developed by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to explain the violence in the region by reading the introductory and concluding sections to each of Chapters Three to Ten inclusive.

The introductory section to Chapter Three, for example, outlines the theory developed by the ANC to explain the violence in the region during the 1980s. The concluding section of the chapter elaborates on the introduction, and describes the ANC's theory of the violence in more detail. It does so in the light of the evidence which appears to substantiate the ANC's perspective-and which forms the middle section of the chapter.

It is thus possible to obtain an overview of the ANC's perspective on conflict in Natal in the 1980s by reading the first and last sections of Chapter Three-though the ANC's theory is, of course, best understood by reading the evidence which supports it as well.

Chapter Four is structured in the same way. The introductory section outlines the theory developed by Inkatha to explain the violence in the 1980s, while the concluding section elaborates on this and describes Inkatha's theory of the violence in more detail. Again, it does so in the light of the evidence which seems to substantiate Inkatha's view-and which forms the middle section of the chapter.

Chapters Five to Ten follow the same format, and can likewise be used to obtain an overview of the differing perspectives of the ANC and the IFP. In all instances, it remains important to read the evidence which supports the rival theories as well-for it is this which contributes to understanding of the different viewpoints, and which provides a basis for informed assessment of their merits.

Contents

Chapter One

Introduction

Chapter Two

A Historical Background

Chapter Three

Collaboration and Repression in the 1980s

Chapter Four

The Strategy of 'Ungovernability' in the 1980s

Chapter Five

Destabilisation through 'Low Intensity Warfare' from 1990 to 1993

Chapter Six

Ensuring a Two-Sided Negotiating Table from 1990 to 1993

Chapter Seven

Subverting the Transition to Democracy in 1994

Chapter Eight

Destabilising the Opposition in 1994

Chapter Nine

Progress is Made But Problems Persist in 1995 and 1996

Chapter Ten

Increased Repression and Continued Attack in 1995 and 1996

Chapter Eleven

Other Views on Violence in KwaZulu/Natal from 1992 to 1994

Chapter Twelve

Further Allegations and Evidence About Violence in 1995 and 1996

Chapter Thirteen

The Questions that Remain Unanswered

Map

Bibliography

Detailed Contents

Chapter One

Introduction

Environmental factors

Social conditions

Economic circumstances

Political factors

Some views on the significance of socio-economic factors

The incidence of faction fighting

The methodology applied in this study

Chapter Two

A Historical Background

The liberatory strategies of the ANC alliance

The alternative approach adopted by Inkatha

The Soweto revolt in 1976

The ANC/Inkatha meeting in London in 1979

Postcript to the London meeting

Tensions intensify from early 1980

Chapter Three

Collaboration and Repression in the 1980s-The Viewpoint of the ANC Alliance

Introduction

Early collaboration

Repression of student protests in 1980

Killings at Ngoye in 1983

Compelling incorporation into KwaZulu in 1984

Deploying vigilantes in Durban in 1985

Continued vigilante action against the UDF in 1986

Forced recruitment sparks war in Pietermaritzburg in 1987

Continued vigilante attacks in 1988

Peace talks fail and violence intensifies in 1989

Explaining the violence in the 1980s

Chapter Four

The Strategy of 'Ungovernability' in the 1980s-The Viewpoint of Inkatha

Introduction

Consolidating power and then challenging apartheid

Safeguarding pupils against coercion in 1980

Violence at Lamontville and Ngoye in 1983

Violence in Pietermaritzburg and Durban in 1984

Riots in Durban in 1985

Intensifying 'ungovernability' in 1986

War breaks out in Pietermaritzburg in 1987

Continued conflict and a peace accord in 1988

Violence spreads and peace talks fail in 1989

Explaining the violence in the 1980s

Chapter Five

Destabilisation through 'Low Intensity Warfare' from 1990 to 1993-The Viewpoint of the ANC alliance

Introduction

Intensifying 'LIW' in 1990

Peace attempts thwarted in 1991

Exposing the surrogates in 1992

Patience finally rewarded in 1993

Explaining the violence in the early 1990s

Chapter Six

Ensuring a Two-Sided Negotiating Table from 1990 to 1993-The Viewpoint of the Inkatha Freedom Party

Introduction

Intensifying the campaign against Inkatha and KwaZulu in 1990

Increasing assassination of IFP leaders in 1991

Intensifying 'coercive mobilisation' in 1992

Paying lip service to peace while mobilising for war in 1993

Explaining the violence in the early 1990s

Chapter Seven

Subverting the Transition to Democracy in 1994-The Viewpoint of the ANC Alliance

Introduction

Denying free political activity in KwaZulu and Natal in early 1994

Violence persists in the post-election period in 1994

Explaining continued violence after the April election

Chapter Eight

Destabilising the Opposition in 1994-The Viewpoint of the Inkatha Freedom Party

Introduction

Destabilising the opposition in the run-up to elections

An unchanged agenda in the post-election period

Explaining continued violence after the April election

Chapter Nine

Progress is Made But Problems Persist in 1995 and 1996-The Viewpoint of the ANC Alliance

Introduction

The role of the Zulu monarch

The position of the chiefs in KwaZulu/Natal

The question of international mediation

A provincial constitution for KwaZulu/Natal

The Shell House issue

Pending local government elections

Continued conflict and increased security measures

Explaining continued conflict in 1995 and 1996

Chapter Ten

Increased Repression and Continued Attack in 1995 and 1996-The Viewpoint of the Inkatha Freedom Party

Introduction

The role of the Zulu monarch

The position of the chiefs in KwaZulu/Natal

The question of international mediation

A provincial constitution for KwaZulu/Natal

The Shell House issue

Pending local government elections

Continued conflict and increased repression

Explaining continued conflict in 1995 and 1996

Chapter Eleven

Other Views on Violence in KwaZulu/Natal from 1992 to 1994

Comments on the ANC's perspective

The IFP's comments on the ANC theory

Comments by others on the ANC theory

Comments on the IFP's perspective

The ANC's comments on the IFP theory

Comments by other commentators

Relevant reports of the Goldstone commission

First reports on Bruntville

Second interim report

Report on Renamo soldiers in KwaZulu

Third interim report

Final report on Bruntville

Report on the training of IFP supporters in the Caprivi in 1986

Report on illegal importation, distribution and use of firearms

Fourth interim report

Report on criminal political violence within the SAP, KZP and IFP

The main report

Report on hit squads in the KZP

Report on other causes of political violence

Report on the Shell House and other shootings in Johannesburg

Report on attacks on the SAP

Report on the KZP's attempted purchase of firearms from Eskom

Final report of the commission

ANC comments on the findings of the Goldstone commission

Comments by the SAP in submissions to the Goldstone commission

IFP comments on the findings of the Goldstone commission

Failure to investigate various massacres of IFP supporters

Failure to investigate the assassination of IFP office-bearers

Failure to investigate the role of Umkhonto in the violence

Reports for the TEC

TEC task team report into 'hit-squad' activity within the KZP

Report on training at the Mlaba camp

Comments by the ANC and the IFP on the TEC's reports

The IFP's response to the TEC report on hit squads

The IFP's response to the TEC report on training at the Mlaba camp

Chapter Twelve

Further Allegations and Evidence About Violence in 1995 and 1996

Introduction

The Mbambo trial

The Malan trial

The De Kock trial

Chapter Thirteen

The Questions that Remain Unanswered

Introduction

Questions regarding the ANC theory

Questions regarding the IFP theory

Conclusion

Map

Bibliography

This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. Return to the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory site.