Civics

‘No to councillors!’

In the African townships located outside the major cities of “white” South Africa, the UDF and its affiliates campaigned to reject the black local authorities.

Apartheid laws ruled that people who were in the racial category “African” could not be citizens of the Republic of South Africa. “Africans” living in the townships around the white cities could stay there only if they had permission to work there. All Africans without permission to stay in white areas were “removed” – often by force – to rural places called “homelands”.

Botha’s “new deal” (read more about this here) aimed to reinforce this situation by creating “black local authorities” in the townships. Africans living in the townships would be allowed to vote for these authorities – but not for the national government in the Republic of South Africa. At the same time, black local authorities would be paid by, and remain under the control of, the national government’s Bantu Administration Board – white officials appointed by the whites-only government.

The UDF took up all these issues. From November 1983, the UDF called for a boycott of elections for black local authorities.

No rent increase for matchboxes

The fight against black local authorities and the Bantu Administration ran side by side with the struggle against increases in rents, electricity, rates, and public transport fares for the black communities.

The black local authorities were expected to pay for most of the “administration” of the townships through raising money from the people who lived in there. At this time, the black local authorities owned all houses in the black townships and rented them out to people – a person classified as African could not own a house in a “white area”. And there were few businesses or factories in the townships, so the authorities did not make money from taxing business. Therefore, the black local authorities tried to make people pay higher rents. They also made money through selling beer through beerhalls owned and run by the Bantu Administration Boards.

In the early 1980s, the black local authorities raised the costs of rent, electricity, water, and transport in many black townships. People began to organise protests against these increases in the cost of living. These protests became one with the rejection of the black local authorities by the UDF. People organised into community groups (called “civics"); these said “NO to community councils, NO to the black local councillors, NO to the Bantu Administration system.”

The Vaal uprising

The community’s resistance to the apartheid regime came to a head in September 1984, in the Vaal Triangle.

In August 1984, the government held elections for the (coloured) House of Representatives and the (Indian) House of Delegates, but people organised massive boycotts under the banner of the UDF. Countrywide, fewer than 10% of the Indians and coloureds eligible to vote actually cast a vote.

In the “black” areas, resistance grew against the black local authorities. In the townships of the Vaal Triangle, meetings, protests and marches were organised and demands made through the month of August. Then on September 3, 1984, police opened fire on a march called by the UDF-linked Vaal Civics Association to protest higher rents and rates. People fought back. Violence spread across the Witwatersrand.

– Source: This version of events has been adapted from Jochelson, K. “Rent Boycotts: Local Authorities on their Knees” Work in Progress no. 44 (Sept/October 1986), p17 ff

The road to Bloody Monday

Before 1984, the apartheid government thought that the black local authorities in the Vaal townships were the “most successful in the country”. 

The Lekoa Town Council was elected in November 1983, to become the first “elected” black town council in the country. Only 14.7% of the people who could vote actually did vote. (This was well above the national average of people voting for black local authorities.) Moreover, the Vaal local authorities had for years managed to make a profit – which they did by raising the costs of rents for township houses from an average of R11,87 per month in 1977 to R62,56 per month in 1984. (In 1984, this was R10 per month higher than any other township in the country.)

In late July 1984 the Lekoa Town Council announced a new rent increase. 

A UDF affiliate called the Vaal Civic Association (VCA) mobilised opposition to the rent increase. The VCA had been launched in October 1983, to oppose the November 1983 black local authorities elections.

When rent increases were announced in July, the VCA organised an anti-rent campaign. It issued press statements against the increase, distributed pamphlets, and held meetings in all the affected areas:  Boipatong, Sebokeng, Evaton Small Farms, Sharpeville, and Bophelong.

The Sebokeng gathering decided to meet on Monday September 3 at the Roman Catholic Church in Small Farms. From there, people would march to the administration offices to express their dissatisfaction.

The Anti-Rent Committee held meetings at the Sharpeville Anglican church every Sunday between August 12 and September 2.

The council refused to listen, and would not stop the rent increase. Instead the council warned the church leaders in the Vaal that the black local authority would take away their churches’ “site permit” if they continued to hold political meetings in church builidings (the town council issued permits to allow a church to meet on a township plot).

On August 29, hundreds of Bophelong residents met with the community councillors. The council members were armed: the “council mayor”, Mahlatsi, and the “deputy mayor”, Dlamini, carried two guns each.

Angry residents demanded that the mayor answer their questions about the rent increase and a new deposit for electricity. But the police switched off the hall lights, escorted the councillors out of the building, and then fired teargas at the residents in the hall.

Later that night police shot at youths in Bophelong. Violence between residents and police continued over the next week. Then, on the night of September 2, three youths were killed.

On September 3, police stopped marchers from Sharpeville and Boipatong from leaving for Sebokeng, killing several marchers.

In Sharpeville, protesters attacked and killed the deputy mayor, Dlamini.

Police also attacked people in a march from Small Farms, in Evaton. More violence erupted in Sebokeng and Evaton. Many protesters were killed; and the crowd in turn killed two Lekoa councillors and one Evaton councillor.

The government was later to charge a number of UDF and community activists for this violence, in the Delmas Treason Trial.

The violence continued, and spread. People attacked the Vaal Administration buildings, beerhalls, and homes and businesses belonging to councillors and police. Police shot, wounded, and killed countless people. They arrested thousands of residents. Police also went to the Vaal hospitals, arresting people who came for treatment for bullet wounds. Others who were shot or injured in the unrest did not go to hospital. In the next five days more than 40 people died: police killed over 90% of these.

After September 3, almost all of those associated with organising the rent protest were arrested or went into hiding away from the Vaal.

(This version of events has been adapted from: Rent Boycotts: Local Authorities on their Knees by Karen Jochelson, Work in Progress no 44 (Sept/October 1986) p17 ff)

Bloody Monday

Here is a description by one young man of his experiences in the Vaal uprising in September 1984:

“Before Bloody Monday, people in the Vaal Triangle were protesting about the new rents. The Lekoa Council wanted to increase their rents by R5.95. Churches and other organisations warned the council.  But their words fell on deaf ears. People asked the councillors to resign too. The people said that they did not choose them.

“Days passed. Nobody said anything. Then towards the end of August, meetings were held. People decided that they would not go to work on Monday the 3rd. It was to be a day of protest against the rent increases.

“… [W]hen Monday came, everyone stayed at home.

“I was living with my parents in Sebokeng and I was worried. My parents wanted me to stay at home. But this I couldn’t do.

“I crept out of the yard and met my two friends, Siphiwe and Xolile. We went down the road. All the shops were closed. People stood around in small groups, talking. Everyone talked about the new rent.

“I felt that things were very wrong. The road was blocked with stones. Buses had stopped.

“We found a big group of people at the Roman Catholic Church. They were looking at the road. I ran to see what was happening. People were stoning a car. Suddenly four Hippos appeared. The people ran away to the shopping centre. Three Hippos passed but one turned and followed the crowd. We followed. Then we got to the shopping centre. I hid behind a fence and watched.

“The crowd picked up stones and went towards the police. There were too many stones and soon the police drove off. People began to sing. Then they went to the bottle store and took crates of beer.

“Suddenly two more police trucks came and fired teargas. I didn’t know what it was. The others ran. But I stayed at the fence. A cop fired a rubber bullet. It landed close to me. I went and picked it up.  Suddenly I became dizzy. Pain hit my eyes. I ran to get water and washed my face. The water helped.”

– Source: Adapted from Rantete, J. The Third Day of September. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985. p37 No 1

Black Christmas: no reason to celebrate

Across the Transvaal, the UDF and its affiliates called on people not to celebrate Christmas. Popo Molefe, the general secretary of the UDF, asked people to call for the Black Christmas period to last from December 16 to 26.

Consumer boycotts in 1985: organising resistance

The consumer boycott call came out of community organisations and grew in 1985, spearheaded by the UDF and affiliated organisations. These put forward explicitly political national demands: lifting the State of Emergency, removing police and army from townships, and the release of all political prisoners and detainees. 

The boycotts took the form of not buying from mainly white-owned shops, and shops owned by black collaborators with the apartheid regime.

In some cases, these were supplemented by local demands such as those for democratic student representative councils and demands aimed at local government. Cosatu added a national demand for political rights for all.

The boycott began piecemeal in a number of small Cape towns. It grew in Port Elizabeth by mid-July, then spread through the rest of the Eastern Cape, and to the Western Cape, the Transvaal, and Natal.

A report on the consumer boycotts in Work in Progress in 1985 states:

“The first major urban focus of consumer boycott action, Port Elizabeth, has seen almost total community support for the campaign since it began on 14 July …

“Initiative for the boycott came in early July from a group of township women, which grew from an initial 150 to 700. A number were members of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (Pebco), and the Port Elizabeth Youth Congress (Peyco), but many were unaligned. They were angry about police brutality, the State of Emergency, township conditions, and the infighting between the UDF and Azapo. The community’s energy should be directed at the oppressors, they said. 

“Local community activists and leaders were hesitant about taking boycott action, and this was debated thoroughly … community organisers felt they could not ignore spontaneous action from their constituents. But they had to ensure it took a constructive political direction, and that organisational strength and depth were improved in the process ...

“The UDF and its affiliates took the lead in discussing tactics and calling the boycott … The ‘conglomeration of township organisations’ which initially made up the Consumer Boycott Committee were the UDF, Pebco, Peyco, Cosas (until it was banned), the Eastern Province Dance Association, various organisations from Port Elizabeth’s northern areas, and the UDF-affiliated Motor Assemblers and Components Workers’ Union of South Africa (Macwusa) and the General Workers’ Union of SA (Gwusa).

“The group of women were eager to begin the boycott immediately, and there appeared to be fairly widespread support for it. UDF leaders argued that the boycott had to be well publicised, the community mobilised around the call, and clear demands and strategies set out …

“Derrick Swartz, local UDF general secretary, explained: ‘Because we had won the support of the community in the past, many sports bodies, church organisations and community bodies joined the committee. Rank-and-file workers also appeared to give full support.’ But, he added, the disappearance of Pebco leadership, detentions, and the organisational demands of the Goniwe funeral meant that remaining leadership was stretched very thin …

“Spreading the word about the boycott was fairly easy, according to Swartz. It was discussed and publicised mainly at funerals, which were often attended by up to 60 000 people, and at mass meetings.”

– Source: From Work In Progress no. 39 (October 1985), p13-14

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